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The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
concludes with these words:  "...  nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."  This  has been the basis for all policies and debates
concerning the control  or regulation of land use throughout the history of the Republic.
Its full force was  made binding  upon member  states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, incorporated  into  the Constitution in  1868 in the aftermath  of the
American Civil War, which states in Section  1:  "No  state shall make or enforce  any law
which shall abridge  the privileges or immunities  of citizens  of the United  States; nor
shall any State  deprive any person of life,  liberty, or property, without due process  of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction  the equal protection  of the laws."
This paper will sketch the evolution of land use policy under these guiding
principles, with emphasis on the changes that have occurred since the  1920's.  The path
of change  can be divided  into two parts:  The  first concerns  the policies  implemented  in
the outright taking of private property "for public use," through the exercise of powers  of
eminent domain.  The second path involves use  of the police power in the regulation  of
private land use that falls short of an actual "taking."  This discussion will focus  on the
use of the power  of eminent domain.
'Paper presented at Third Annual Conference  on Agricultural Policy and
Environment, sponsored by the University of Padova and the University of Minnesota,
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"Professor  Emeritus, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,  University
of Minnesota, St. Paul.The distinguishing difference  between these two paths is that a "taking" clearly
requires compensation.  A regulation or restriction of land use judged to fall short of a
"taking" does not necessarily require that compensation be paid.  The boundaries  that
permit and define  a "taking" identify the moder  debate over land use policy in the
United States.
A taking of land is an exercise of the power of eminent domain.  It is important
to note that the Fifth Amendment, does not say that private land shall not be taken.
The emphasis is on "just compensation,"  leaving  it to legislatures and courts to determine
whether  or not the exercise  of eminent domain was  achieved  through "due process of
law," and had provided citizens  "the equal protection of the laws."
A regulation  of land use that falls short of a taking is an exercise  of the "police
power."  In the United  States this has been interpreted as an exercise  of state sovereignty
in the interest of public "health,  safety, morals, and general welfare."  It is not
constrained by any constitutional restriction, and the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to substitute  its judgement for that of state legislatures  or the Congress in determining
how far use of the police power can be extended  (Callies, p. 254; Paul, p. 841).
Throughout the  19th and first half of the 20th centuries  the taking of private  land
was judged legal if the land was to be devoted to a "public use."  Early court cases
involved the acquisition of land  as sites for public buildings,  canals, roads, or military
installations.  The ground transport revolution that began with the railroad  era, expanded
with electric street railways, and culminated  with the automobile and motor truck
enormously enlarged the need for land  for rights of way.  These needs led to widespread
2use of eminent  domain, as did the needs for partial takings or easements over land for
electric power transmission lines, pipelines, and hydro-power  dams.
These uses of eminent domain  all fell clearly within the traditional  interpretation
of "public  use."  Beginning in the 1930's and  accelerating  after the war years of 1939-45,
there has been a profound  shift in the basis on which the exercise  of eminent  domain
rests.  In place  of a narrow definition of "public use," the basis has shifted to a much
broader specification  of a "public purpose."  The legal  literature  recording this shift is
voluminous,  and a detailed citation  of court  cases is inappropriate  in this paper.  Instead,
an attempt will be made to sit back  and reflect on how  these changes came  about.
This will involve  the  tracing of several major streams in the recent history of what
can be loosely defined as projects of public works  in the United States.  The first is the
era of big dam building.  Promoted as programs to "get America working" in the
depression years  of the  1930's, the leading symbols were the Hoover Dam on the
Colorado river, the Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri river, and the Tennessee  Valley
Authority.  These  required large areas for lake impoundment and flowage rights, giving
rise to many cases in which land was needed to achieve the purposes  of the dams but its
taking strained the definition of "public use."  The most frequent  cases involved  loss of
access by private land owners, suggesting the wisdom  of acquiring ownership units or
parcels through a  "taking," although water behind the dam or flowage below it might not
actually occupy  all of the parcels.
A second  expansion of public works utilizing eminent domain was the acceleration
of programs  of slum clearance  and urban renewal  after  1945.  Derelict areas in central
3cities became  painfully visible with the rapid suburbanization that began as soon as
wartime  shortages of building materials  ended.  It was  apparent that entire  areas or
districts were involved,  and not simply isolated buildings.
In the 1950's the practice quickly  spread of creating, urban redevelopment
authorities with power to use eminent domain procedures to acquire  all of the land and
buildings in designated  areas.  Typically,  they would raze the buildings, realign streets  or
public utilities if necessary,  and resell the land to private developers.  Eminent domain
power was being used to take  land from one group of private owners  and resell it to a
different group of private owners.
It was  obvious that this was  necessary if the goals of urban renewal were  to be
achieved while maintaining a system of predominantly private ownership  of urban
housing.  It was also  obvious that the land thus  taken by eminent domain was not being
devoted to a "public use," in the conventional meaning of that phrase.  While legal
challenges were raised,  the courts usually concluded that serving  a public use could be
interpreted  to mean serving a public purpose.
This interpretation  should not be surprising, for it continued a land tenure
practice  that is as old  as the nation.  Lands taken from Indian occupants,  by treaty or
force, were declared a part of the public domain and offered for resale to developers,  i.e.
to new settlers.  The power of the state was used to take land from one owner and make
it available to another.  As repugnant  as this power is, its toleration has clearly been a
function of the goal being pursued.  When settlement  of the West or removal  of urban
4blight has been involved, the government  of the United  States has not hesitated to
interpose itself between private land  owners to effect  changes in land  use.
This extension of the concept of public use to include public purpose was given  a
powerful  acceleration  by the National  Interstate and Defense  Highway Act of 1956.  This
involved the design and lay-out  of over  40,000 miles (more than 65,000  kilometers)  of
dual-lane,  divided-center  highways,  for which  the typical right-of-way  was at least 330 feet
or over  one hundred meters wide.  These new superhighways were  to provide by-passes
around cities  and (as nearly as possible)  straight-line  connections  between major  urban
and industrial centers.  Acquiring the necessary  land triggered  the largest exercise  of the
power  of eminent domain in the nation's history.
Major problems quickly  arose.  To understand  the set of problems that helped
shape the transition from public use to public purpose in justifying the taking of private
land, it is necessary  to outline the configuration  of land ownership  patterns in the United
States.  In the  13  original colonies,  clustered along the Atlantic  seaboard,  survey
descriptions  of land  ownership rights  followed a European pattern, characterized  as
"metes  and bounds."  Property lines depended primarily on identification with elements
in the physical  landscape.  In the states carved out of lands outside the original colonies,
a  different system  of rectangular survey was used.  In these "public land" states the
patterns  of land  ownership take on a Cartesian character, with property boundaries
running at right  angles in East-West  and North-South directions,  forming  a gigantic grid.
The operating  lay-out of farms  and the street pattern of many cities  in the mid-West and
5West  of the United  States reflect these grid-like configurations.  The road system that
emerged  with settlement also followed  these chess-board property lines.
Many segments  of the newly authorized  Interstate system of superhighways
crossed these East-West and North-South property lines at an angle  as they curved
around  cities and headed  for neighboring cities "as the crow flies."  The result was the
truncation of many land ownership  parcels, leaving triangular or irregular shaped
remnants  of land  on either side of the newly-located  highway.  Original land owners
often had  no access to these severed tracts, or found it uneconomic to continue  using
them.  The tracts  thus severed were clearly not being "used" in a direct sense for the new
highways, but were  also rendered  almost useless  to their previous owners.
From this dilemma  emerged the principle  of "excess  condemnation."  Even though
the whole of an ownership unit was not needed for highway right of way, it was cheaper
to take the entire unit and sell any remnant tracts.  Property  owners in many states have
been given the option to demand that the condemning  authority take  their entire
ownership  units rather than the parts actually  "needed."
In this way highway authorities found themselves engaged  in using the power  of
eminent domain to take land from one private owner and later sell it to another private
owner.  As was the case with urban renewal  and slum-clearance  programs, powerful
reasons emerged  for a transition from "public use" to "public purpose" as a justification
for exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Two points merit emphasis in tracing  this experience  with the highway program.
The first is that it affected every state, and concerned  a widely (if not universally)
6approved exercise  of public authority.  The second is that many of the most uneconomic
consequences  of a narrow insistence  on "public use" as  a justification for taking private
land concerned  farm  land.  Farm land owners, as a group, are typically stout defenders
of the rights of private land owners.  The fact that they could  experience  first-hand  the
logic and economy of taking land in excess  of that actually "needed" undoubtedly played
an important role in developing general support for the courts in reinterpreting public
use to include public purpose.  As a vehicle for public education in constitutional  law,
the Interstate  Highway program has been outstanding.
This background  makes understandable  the decision of the U.S.  Supreme Court in
1984 upholding the right of the Hawaii Housing Authority, under the Hawaii Land
Reform Act of 1967, to use  eminent domain powers to compel large landowners  to sell
leased land to their tenants.  (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,  1984).
The goal was to reduce  the concentrated  power of some  72 large land  holding families  in
Hawaii, holding 47 percent of the state's lands, whose  holdings traced back to a semi-
feudal  era and included most of the value represented  by residential  land in the state's
principal  cities.  The goal of the Hawaii Housing Authority was virtually no different  in
principle  from that validated  by the Supreme  Court thirty years earlier in a  1954 case
involving urban renewal  (Berman v. Parker, 348  U.S. 26.  1954).
Justice  Sandra Day O'Connor, in the concluding paragraph  of the Supreme
Court's  opinion in the Hawaii  case,  pointed out that 'The  Hawaii Legislature  enacted its
Land Reform Act not to benefit a particular  class of identifiable  individuals but to attack
certain perceived  evils of concentrated  property ownership  in Hawaii--a  legitimate public
7purpose.  Use of the condemnation power to achieve  this purpose is not irrational.  Since
we assume for purposes of these appeals  that the weighty demand  of just compensation
has been met, the requirement of the Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments  have  been
satisfied."  (467  U.S. 245,  1984).
Earlier  in its decision the Court had  said:  "...  the Court has made clear that it will
not substitute its judgement for a legislature's judgement as to what constitutes a public
use  'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.'  ... where the exercise  of
the eminent  domain power is rationally related to a conceivable  public purpose, the
Court has  never held a compensated  taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause....
On this basis we have no trouble concluding  that the Hawaii Act is constitutional"  (467
US 241).  The decision of the Court was unanimous.
This is where the matter seems to rest.  If a taking of private land is reasonably
related to a public purpose  as determined  by a state's legislature,  the Supreme  Court will
not interfere  as long as just compensation  is paid.  This throws the principal burden of
decisions as to the proper  exercise  of eminent domain power on the method and
standards by which  compensation  is determined.
This has worked reasonably well in the United States  due to the  existence  of an
active land and real estate  market.  It is not unreasonable to argue  in the United States
that monetary compensation can stand as a proxy for land ownership.  It is  an open
society,  with a high degree of physical mobility.  The  U.S. Postal Service reported  for
1990 that  18 percent of all postal addresses  were changed in that year.  Loss of land or
8homesite  is not the catastrophic  event that it would be in a more rigid social  or
economic system.
The anomalous  result is that the very existence  of a functioning  private market  for
land makes  it possible to tolerate in the United States a level of public taking of private
land that would be regarded  as intolerable  in most other countries.  The greater the
efficiency of the market process the less frightening  is the exercise  of public power over
private land.
There remains  of course  the second path of evolution  of public  control over
private  land, through  use of the police power.  Since  this has  typically involved regulation
without compensation,  it has been an even  more contentious  exercise  of public policy
than has the use of eminent domain.  But that is another paper.
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